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During the past two years at sea, one year as the
executive officer of the U. S. S. Bushneil, a submarine
tender, and the other year as the Commander of a Division
of Submarines, I was thrown intimately and directly into
a serious personnel Droblem. The dilemma facing the Navy
today is how to build a hard core of professional sailors
to fight the fleet. A very small percentage of the young
intelligent men are reenlisting and rarely does a senior
petty officer remain after twenty years of service. There
are many reasons why this situation exists including
heavy operating schedules, long absences from home, the
gradual whittling away of fringe benefits by congress,
the substantial monetary gains by labor compared to the
lower pay of the Navy, and last but not least the military
personnel management of the Navy.
In this paper I will explain why I think the mili-
tary personnel management in the Navy is not what it should
be, generally. There are exceptions, some ships and stations
are models of mature, intelligent management, others are
very poorly managed. The panacea for all substandard manage-
ment in the Navy today seems to be better leadership, a
very popular subject, it is being talked about by the Chief




report, books on it are required reading for promotion and
it is universally a popular subject. I do not belittle
the necessity for leadership or of its value, but I will
point out that there is a facet of leadership that has
been neglected, communications upward, and that there
are several brands of leadership all of which are not now
effective. I will emphasize democratic leadership.
Democratic leadership is a -new twist to the philo-
sophy of leadership in the Navy and to my knowledge not
completely accepted or used in any military installation
or ship. I have seen it used in part and have used to some
extent the principles with great success. It is my firm
belief that its application and use throughout the Navy
tf.ll materially contribute to enticing young intelligent
men to make the Navy their career. The practical job to
be done is to put the Navy in a favorable bargaining posi-
tion with industry for the best men. In the final analysis,
the fleet is no better than the men who man it. Poor
morale and second-rate men mean a second-rate Navy.
I am indebted to Dr. A. Rex Johnson who stimulated
my thinking along the lines of human relations in the
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One very popular word in the Navy is "motivation".
Whenever two personnel-conscious naval officers f; et to-
gether they begin "motivating" somebody to do or not to do
something. While much has been learned about motivation,
the ideal, that all human drives could be channeled to-
ward a purpose, has not been realized. The exact process
by which love, pride, sex, and pugnacity can be directed
toward productive effort has not been discovered,! As the
Navy's reenlistment rate clearly shows the ability to har-
ness human drives to reenlist in the Navy is more an art
than a science.
How then, if motivation cannot be controlled, are
we to influence men to like the Navy well enough to re-
enlist? The first step should be, to make them as nearly
satisfied as possible by reducing the conflicts and ten-
sions in their everyday life on board the ships or station.
Chris Argyris of the Yale University Labor and Manage-
ment Center suggests that satisfied men are men with healthy
personalities. He states that the man with the healthy
personality is one who is well adapted to his enviornment
•""William H. Knowles, Personnel Management (New
York: American Book Company, 1955) > P» 64.

and internally adjusted. 1
The problem, therefore, resolves into th© task of
developing healthy personalities in a majority of men, if
possible. A practical and useable description is extreme-
ly complex but in the material below, I have attempted to
give its flavors, as self-respect, the feeling of security,
self-knowledge, self-expression, contact with reality, a
balance between independence and dependence, and goal set-
ting and achievement.
Self-respect is confidence in our personality,
self-tolerance, and self-love. As Brie Froram suggests:
If it is a virtue to love my neighbor as a human being,
it must be a virtue, and not a vice, to love myself
since I am a human being too. There is no concept of
man in which I, myself, am not included. The idea
expressed in the Biblical 'Love thy neighbor as thy-
self 1 implies that respect for one's own integrity
and uniqueness, love for and understanding of one's
own self cannot be separated from respect for and love
and understanding of another individual. The love for
my own self is inseparably connected with the love for
any other self. 2
To differentiate between self-love and selfishness
Promm writes:
Selfishness and self-love, far from being identical
are actually opposltes. The selfish person does not
^Chris Argyris, Personality Fundamentals For
Administrators (New Haven: Yale University Labor and
Management Center, 1953) » P* 109.
2Eric Fromm, Man For Himself (New York: Rinehart
and Company, Inc., 19477, p. 12&- p. 129*

love himself too much but too little; in fact he hates
himself. This lack of fondness and care of himself,
leaves him empty and frustrated. He is necessarily
unhappy and anxiously concerned to snatch from life the
satisfactions which he blocks himself from attaining.
He seems to care too much for himself but actually he
only makes an unsuccessful attempt to cover up and
compensate for his failure to care for his real self.
It is true that selfish persons are incapable of lov-
ing others, but they are not capable of loving them-
selves either.
1
A man who has lost his self-respect is not a useful person
in society and his presence on board a ship is most det-
rimental to the goal of motivating men to reenlist.
The feeling of security is used as a feeling of
belonging to the organization not to the need for finan-
cial security. The need to be needed describes a very
significant fact about people. Everyone wants to feel that
what he does makes a difference to someone else. He has a
genuine need to believe that in addition to earning money
to support his family or his appetite for pleasures he is
making a worthwhile contribution to something of substance
and importance. Everyone wants recognition but more
satisfaction is received and it is more desirable if it re-
sults from the knowledge that he has really achieved some-
thing. 2
^Ibid., 131.
2rm. Finlay, A. Q. Sartain, Willis M. Tate,
Human Behavior In Industry (New York: McGraw-Hill Co.,
19547i P. 28.

4There is grave danger that some men in the Navy may
regard themselves as insignificant because they are as-
signed unimportant tasks and they cannot identify them-
selves with any practical goal or value. A man must feel
wanted by his own people, by his own shipmates and by the
Navy. He must feel Hat home" in the world in which he lives.
In his group, the Individual should be encouraged by loyal-
ties that are mutually satisfying.
Self-knowledge is the first step to understanding
and getting along with others. One of the most important
facts about the individual is his feelings and thoughts
about who he is, where he is, what he is, and why he is.
Every man carries around in himself a picture which he will
go to great extremes to keep satisfactory and to try to im-
prove. A healthy person, therefore, tries to recognize
the limitations in himself and others. Each officer or
petty officer should be encouraged to attempt to know him-
self in order that he may understand others around him.
Self-expression should be spontaneous from a re-
laxed man. He needs a sense of humor to be able to re-
sound from the inevitable tenseness and frustrations of
military life. He must be able to smile and laugh freely.
This may best be injected by the example of the leaders.
1 Ibid.

Contact with reality is important. There exist two
worlds, the objective and the subjective. The former is
the world people admit exists and the latter, the subjec-
tive or "private" world, is a man's personal viev, of the
objective world. Only by understanding botn worlds is he
able to make allowances in his own dealings with people and
to understand other's views. He is then better equipped to
withstand the ordinary shocks of life, by tending to live
realistically, free from fantasy, day dreaming, or wishful
thinking. To accept reality is to feel responsible for our
actions, for a man to know he is wrong is to be right.
A balance of the independence and dependence in a
man is his ability to cooperate and still be independent}
it is the ability to follow as well as to lead depending
upon the situation. Balance is the important point and is
particularly useful and necessary in the armed services.
Goal-setting and achievement are important ingre-
dients of life. All individuals are constantly seeking to
be possessed of a sense of worthwhileness. The wish for
worth is tremendously strong. People want to register, to
count, to be identified and acknowledged as individuals.
Each of us carries about an image of the self to which
each refers in making choices in life, and when others treat
us in a wa y to deny or belittle the image the result is

6resentment, defense, resistance, an<3 in extreme cases h?te
.and violence. The goals should fulfill inner needs and
be high enough to mal.e a person put up a fight but just
2
weak enough to be finally overcome.
Lippitt and Bradford suggest that people who feel
psychologically successful tend to:
1. Raise their goals.
2. Gain greater confidence in their ability in the
activity.
3. Increase their persistence to future goals.
4. Increase their ability to cooperate and work.
5. Increase their ability to adapt readily to new
situations.
6. Increase their emotional control.
No one can deny that even partial achievement of the above
six behavior tendencies would greatly facilitate Navy
management.
^
Some an ay ask why it is necessary to worry about
healthy personalities when all that is necessary is to use
F. Ordway Tead, The Art of Administration (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 195D , F« 46.
2Chris Argyris, Personality Fundamentals For Ad-
ministrators (New Haven:"" Yale University Labor and Manage-
ment Center, 1953), PP» 1o9-115»
oRonald Lippitt and Leland Bradford, "Employee
Success in Work Group", Personnell Administration , III
(December 194-5), 6-10.

just plain common sense. Common sense answers are answers
based primarily on one individual's attempt to explain
certain problems using a background of his own experience.
Consequently, common sense answers are limited by scien-
tific standards. The supposedly common sense sayings people
use so often imply that the lesson expressed is the truth.
For example,
1. "Repeat a lie frequently enough and people will
believe it."
2. "Clothes make a man."
3. MYou can't teach an old dog new tricks."
4. "Out of sight, out of mind."
All of these phrases have been used as common sense
arguments at one time or another. The express "truths"
that have weathered the "years of hard knocks". But for
every truth above "common sense" supplies us with a con-
tradictory "truth",
1. "The truth will always prevail."
2. "You can't make a silk purse out of a sow's
ear."
3. "Never too old to learn."
4. "Absence makes the heart grow fonder."
The second reason for the limitation of common
sense answers are the following scientific facts;
1. We tend to look at our social world through a set

of colored spectacles.
2. We have a habit of wanting practical results
rather than objective da ta in any situation.
3. We affect the very situation which we want to
observe.
1
This adds up to the fact that common sense answers are ex-
actly what a person wants to believe are correct answers
for a given problem.
*
In summary, the military manager must be aware of
the complexity of the human personality and the unrelia-
bility of using common sense. In the Navy there are certain
so-called common sense truths, "A taut ship is a happy
ship* 1 and "In every ship there must be at least one P.O.B",
that are used and applied ineptly and indiscriminately. In
reply to these so-called truths the mature Navy manager
should ask himself the following questions, "Eow do you
make a taut ship happy?", and "What is the quickest way to
get rid of the S.O.B.?" If the use of common sense is so
inept, what, then, should be the method of tackling a
problem in human relations? In answering my own question,
x
Lowell J. Carr, Situational Analysis (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 5.
2Cnris Argyris, Personality Funda centals For Ad-
ministrators (New Haven;"" Yale University Labor and Manage-
ment Center, 1953) » PP« 4-5.

the first step is to realize that the problem by its very
nature is complex and requires careful thought. A quick
decision may be worse than no decision. The next step is
to try to understand the relationship between the problem
and the human personality needs, the need for self-respect,
the need for a feeling of security, the need for self-
knowledge, the need for self-expression, the need for con-
tact with reality, and the need for a feeling of achieve-
ment. When you feel you know juniors' views and feelings
on the problem and you know all of the material facts,
look at your own prejudices, values and feelings and try to
compensate for the bias in your decision-making. Self
awareness acts like the "Kentucky windage" a marksman uses
when, for some reason, he knows that the sights on his
1
rifle are not accurate.
Dean Donham of Harvard University approaches the
problem from a slightly different way. His ten simple
rules are quoted:
1. Learn all about a problem before trying to solve
it. Listen a lot, talk a little.
2. See the total situation. Don't act on just part
of it.
3. Don't be deceived by logic. Most problems are full
of emotion. Emotions aren't logical.
4. Watch the meaning of words. Look behind words to
get their full impact.
Chris Argyris, "Human Relations In A Bank",




5. No moral judgments, please. Until you have diag-
nosed a problem, don't leap to conclusions about what
is right and what is wrong.
6. Imagine yourself in the other fellows shoes. See
how the problem looks from where he sits.
7. When a problem gets you down, get away from it.
Put it in the back of your mind for a week. When you
approach it again, the solution may be obvious.
8. Ask yourself, "What are the forces acting upon
the other fellow?" and "Why does he behave as he does?"
9. Diagnosis must come before action. Use the doc-
tor's approach. Don't prescribe until you are sure
what is wrong.
10. Easy does it. Quick solutions are often the quick




The Selective Service Law has forced the marriage
of the philosophy of modern labor and the generally ac-
cepted policy and philosophy of military personnel man-
agement in the Navy. The resolution is a conflict and a
frustration that helps to drive the youths from the Navy
at the first opportunity. I do not mean to infer that
all youths are driven out or that no one in the Navy
other than myself understands the techniques of modern
management. Generally speaking, most of the young men
are not motivated to make the Navy a career and the
average naval officer in a policy position or in com-
mand of a ship is too busy with daily operating chores
to take the necessary time to think through a complex
human relations problem and they are not willing to ac-
cept the fact that there has been a basic change in man-
agement philosophy. One of the easiest things for any-
body to do is to live in the midst of a social change
and still be hardly aware that it is going on. In sup-
port of this incompatible marriage, there follows a
brief picture of the average top level Navy manager, and
H'. W. Finlay, A. Q. Sartain, Willis M. Tate,






a brief description of the changes in labor and manage-
ment relations yet to be fully realized in the Navy.
The policy and top level management of the Wavy
is centered in the regular naval officers between the
ages of about thirty-five and fifty-five of the ranks of
admiral, captain and commander. These are the men who
have the authority to change regulations, to act on ideas
that come from below and to set the tone of management.
These men received their education prior to World War II.
Throughout the war years they were at sea in combat ser-
vice or in shore billets concentrating on technical
problems of logistics or of training men to promote the
war effort. They were aware of the social changes that
this country was undergoing, but hardly concerned, ex-
cept as it directly affected them. All knew that unions
were becoming Influential, but they were not really in-
terested in the meaning of the movement. Even industry
itself was unconscious of the future impact these de-
velopments would bring.
The climate provided by the Roosevelt era com-
bined with the full employment during the war and the
gaining of strength by the labor unions' accelerated the
change in the relationship betv een management and the
worker. The worker could no longer be treated as a com-
modity; he was now organized and could talk back to manage*




Had there been nothing wrong with the manage-
ment technique in industry, pre-war and during the war,
labor unions would have been unable to make the tremen-
dous gains they made. Industry's full occupation with
everyday operating problems and labor's patriotic mo-
tivation to help win the war prevented industrial strife.
However, in 1946 and 1947 there was a great revival of
labor unrest and strife. At this time industry began
seriously to inquire into the causes. The improvement
of management techniques was one of the obvious answers
and something could be done about it.
Where, then, were our naval leaders during this
period? They were working at sea and ashore, but be-
cause of the insulation of the officer corps both in
everyday life and out-of-hours social life from civil-
ian society, these leaders failed to realize the ef-
fect of the victories of the working man in all indus-
tries and institutions that compete for labor. 1 Cer-
tainly they read about the changes in the press, but be-
cause of the great resistance to change and the fact that
A. K. Davis, "Bureaucracy in The Navy", Human
delations in Industry, ed. Robert Dubin (New York:
"rentice Hall 1948), p. 278.
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the Navy is a giant bureaucracy which when confronted with
a problem becomes confused,^ the top management did not
and could not without great drive make the necessary
changes in naval personnel administration. Personnel
policy today at all levels of the Navy is formulated and
executed with very little insight into the actual changes
in the character of the men with whom they are dealing.
In the seventeen years active naval service of the writer,
not once has he seen or heard discussed in a wardroom
any of the modern writings on management, even though the
U. S. Navy is one of the largest institutions in the
world with a crying need for the most expert and intelli-
gent management. Technical competence has been the goal
of the officers at the expense of management "know-how".
Sometimes, incredulously artless methods are
used to accomplish an end. The Navy since the end of the
last war has been trying to reestablish the military cus-
tom of saluting. In this instance the commanding officer
of a destroyer received a directive from his superiors to
raise the standard of military courtesy, particularly
saluting. When communications down failed to obtain re-
sults, he resorted to a practice of requiring each man in
William H. Knowles, Personnel Management (New
York: American Book Company, 1955) » p« 141."
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the crew to salute an officer before he was eligible to
go ashore on liberty.! In the Navy there is no system
whereby the men can safely object without reprisal ex-
cept at captain's mast, and if the captain, as in this
case, was the perpetrator, what man in his right mind
would complain. Very few schemes of this type are estab-
lished on board a naval ship without the knowledge and
the approval of the commanding officer.
To a large Naval Base, the Secretary of the Navy
reputedly sent an admiral H to straighten out" the place
following some bad publicity by a sensational columnist,
Drew Pearson. Among other things, the admiral estab-
lished a curfew for all naval personnel after 2:30 AM.
The curfew was of no particular hardship on anyone, but
there was no clearcut reason for it. *!aybe the admiral
knev :
,
but he failed to comnunicate his reasons to the
naval personnel who were involved. The point is that a
responsible naval commander can be so inept in failing to
prepare the ground before restricting the rights of indi-
viduals. Needless to say, the order was carried out
grudgingly, it produced nothing but contempt for the com-
mander, and was a negative incentive to reenlist in the




Navy. I haven't heard of the admiral's new schemes in his
new job, but I imagine he is applying the same faulty
human relations technique.
Many people contend that the military service is
different from any other type of Institution in the require-
ments for strict obedience and blind following. In the
JEavy intelligent participation is absolutely necessary for
every man and consequently intelligent mature direction is
required. The adherents to the extreme authoritarian view
of management are bound for failure, because the men that
provide the bulk of the Navy grew up in a period of dynamic
change in the relationship between those who work and those
who direct the work. The life long training and enviorn-
mental effects of a majority of these young men cannot be
changed in a few short years. They can be made to con-
orm to a system but it is difficult to make them choose
the Navy as a career.
The structural changes in society in the United
States greatly accelerated by the war, that influence the
character of our modern youth, are the restriction of im-
migration, the broadening of educational opportunities, the
decline in relative importance of agriculture, and the in-
Creased government regulation of labor relations.
1
William H. Knowles, Personnel Management (New
York: American Book Company, 1955) > PP» 16-20.
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With the end of large scale immigration, there came
a limiting of the labor supply. At the present time immi-
gration is generally restricted to Mexican and West Indian
labor for the industrialized agriculture of California and
Florida. No longer can industry solve their labor prob-
lems simply by increasing the labor supply. The Navy, too,
is now forced into competition by scarcity.
The new immigrants who came to this country during
the period of large scale industrialization wera not in a
position to make demands on their employers. They were in
a strange land with strange customs, they spoke a strange
language, and after all, working conditions in the United
States were better than where they came from. The bar-
gaining power of labor was extremely weak, because of the
continuing excess of the labor supply over the available
jobs. Workers were easily replaced by new arrivals from
Europe.
Related to immigration is the fact that labor is
increasingly better educated. A generation ago the average
worker went through grade school, today he has a high
school education. As a result he demands to be treated
with dignity and respect and he knows his legal rights.
Whether we like this fact or not it exists, it must be rec-
ognized, and relations between management and the worker
must be governed accordingly. To emphasize this change it

18
must be remembered that only a short time ago immigrant
labors were considered sub-human and abuses were justi-
fied on the grounds that they had baser appreciations
than management and they had substandard desires. With
the increased education and intelligence of t'ue workers
and sailors in the Navy, the more complicated the manage-
ment problems.
The third significant change is the declining im-
portance of agriculture in this country. Heretofore, the
small property holders with minor social and economic
problems ha d a stabilizing force in the nations politics
and in the continuous struggle between industry and labor.
Now the urban population predominates and the great
masses of Americans sell their labor for wages. Until
relatively recently the rural youths eager to work hard
and take orders willingly and unquestioningly were the
source of labor. With the population shift mentioned above,
labor and the Navy recruit from seconc and third genera-
tion city dwellers who are deeply imbued with the philoso-
phy of working man.
Ten to fifteen years ago unions were confined to
the building trades, railroads and smaller competitive
industries. Union organizers have now successfully organized
the mass production industries. This new look of indus-
trial relations was brought about by the political climate
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of the "New Deal", the depression and by the change in
character of the employees themselves. Life aptly sum-
marizes this changes
From its bloody beginnings U. S. labor has in less
than a century made progress as dramatic as the chang<
from horse and carriage to jet transport. Labor's
top leaders today are as skilled executives drawing
sizable salaries, living in gracious homes and work-
ing in posh offices as impressive as anything their
management counterparts can boast. Their unions have
thousands of members and millions of dollars in
assets, including headquarters and other real estate.
In contrast to the bitter anticapitalism of the past
most union leaders now espouse and play a role as
partners in capitalism.
1
The fourth major change influencing our youth is
the evalution of the position of government in labor
management. Not too long ago the courts were very effec-
tive in nullifying labor laws, but recently the laws have
been upheld as the expression of public policy. For
years strikes, boycotts, and picketing were of question-
able legality. Of late the courts have modified the basic
ideas of private property rights and freedom of contract
by recognizing the rights of labor to strike, boycott, and
picket. Labor is politically minded and consolidating
its forces rapidly. Recent developments of labor legis-
lation and proposed legislation have kept labor manage-
ment relations in a state of flux. Navy management
"New Affluence, Unity for Labor", Life ,
December 12, 1955, p. 26.
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philosophy must be flexible and willing to adapt and
change with the laws, customs and labor policy, if the
Navy is ever to be s. volunteer organization again.
In summary, the vast size of the Navy, the very
nature of a bureaucracy, and the insulation of naval of-
ficers frjm society result in conservative out of date
pers onnel management. A few astute officers in the
Bureau of Naval Personnel are fully aware of the situa-
tion and the remedies but are unable to interest the vast
majority of navy managers in changing.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that increased
education, the decline in the importance of agriculture,
the restriction of immigration and the favorable govern-
ment climate toward labor will continue to exercise a
tremendous Influence on labor relations and on naval
management. You just don't order the modern American
around sucessfully for very long. Ee has a lot of ideas
about how much he knows about his freedom and worth and
you neglect them at your own peril. One of the biggest
limitations in supervising people is to fail to take into
account the great changes that the recent past has brought
about In them. Thus, we try to supervise the 1955 model




^Interview with *• J. Huhe, Commander U. S. N.,
Bureau of Naval Personnel, November 9 f 1955*
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of American worker or sailor as though he were a 1940 model,
a 1935 model or ever a 1925 model* Most Navy managers have
been making the same mistakes every year since 1935» We
might not like this year's model of the American sailor as
well as we liked last year's or that of some previous year,
but this year's model is the model that is out and it is
1
the model we will have to live with, like it or not.
%. W. Finlay, A. Q. Sartain, Willis M. Tate,





Leadership is an all inclusive term indicating con-
trol from the extreme autocratic variety, highly central-
ized to the democratic variety, in the hands of the people.
There are all degrees of each type of control and one fades
off into the other. The use of democratic methods does
not mean that the workers are called together to vote on
each problem that arises. A distinction must be drawn be-
tween pDblems requiring knowledge and expert opinion and
those Involving attitudes and feelings. At times the super-
visor may act in the capacity of an expert to provide ex-
pert opinion.^ The same methods should be effective in the
Navy. With the task identified as one of leading the 1955
model sailor who is intelligent, fully aware of the newly
won rights of the working man, and a product of democratic
environment, the best leadership assumes a democratic
character rather than the character of unilateral sugges-
tion. The leader should not demand obedience without ex-
planation, if he is in a position to let his followers see
the reasons for his decisions. He should not arbitrarily
make demands upon the followers as to the details of action,
rather he should invite initiative and encourage cooperation
kr. Stanley Gray, Psychology in Industry (New




instead of sub-operation. His modus operandi should be to
set the problem, to exhibit means for solution known to
the leader, and to ask his subordinates to carry on from
there.
This changing world has made necessary this new
democratic leadership philosophy, one that is difficult for
most people to accept, but I believe most urgent for each
manager in the Navy to understand, particularly the offi-
cers in the policy and command positions who are so influen-
tial in setting the leadership climate. Generally speak-
ing, the guideposts of this new leadership philosophy are:
In the final analysis, people are basically responsible to
themselves and they alone can tell themselves what to do.
The leader should allow his men to keep this responsi-
bility. Practically all men want to be mature, to be so-
cially accepted, to feel that they belong to a grour , and
to feel that they are needed. The leader will utilize
these basic desires to help him understand and lead his men
and not on the powers given him by the organization. Best
performance and genuine loyalty can effectively be created
in a warm congenial atmosphere in which the individuals
feel free to bring out any attitudes and feelings they may
itiave, no matter how unconventional, absurd, or contradictory
^E. G. 3oring(ed.), Psychology For the Armed





they may be. In the Navy the reverse is usually true.
The leader tries to get across to all that he accepts
them as individuals and that his acceptance does not in-
volve either approval or disapproval of their feelings,
values, and needs. Such a leadership philosophy mini-
mizes such leadership roles as "pusher", "aggressor" or
Mmover" and emphasizes roles such as "helper", "supporter",
"clarifier" and "encourager".
Further clarification of the distinction between
authoritarian and Democratic organization and control is
shown by the following comparison:
Authoritarians All policies are determined by a
few individuals, sometimes by a single individual.
Democratic: Policies affecting the worker are a
matter of group discussion and decision under the guid-
ance and direction of leaders.
Authoritarian: Techniques and policies are dictated
by management as the need arises.
Democratic: Techniques and developments are planned
for ahead of the time when they are put into effect. The
group is aware of the future plans and has had a voice in
the development of such plans.
^Chris Argyris, Executive Leadership (New York:
Harper Brothers, 19535, pp. 111-112.
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Authoritarian: The leaders dictate the work tasks,
schedules, changes etc.
Democratic: The work tasks, schedule, and condi-
tions of work are discussed with employees. They are given
an opportunity to express their feelings and their ideas.
Authoritarian: The leaders are personal in their
praise and rewards, oftentimes showing favoritism based
upon cooperation with management.
Democratic: Praise, rewards, and criticism are
given on the basis of merit. Practices and policies will
be consistent with the feelings and aspirations of the
group.
Authoritarian: Information concerning the poli-
cies, operations, and plans for the future is given out to
the extent that management considers such information will
promote good morale and increase efficiency.
Democratic: Information concerning the policies,
operations, and plans for the future is made known to the
employees, and discussion and study groups are formed for
making special recommendations.-'-
The vast size of the Navy makes true democratic
leadership in all areas of operations and control imprac-
tical, but, in general, where the feelings and attitudes
"NT. Stanley Gray, Psychology in Industry (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 195217 p. 34-2.
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of the men are involved every effort to utilize the new
democratic type of leadership should be made. The cut
of the jaw, the swagger, the clothes, or the superficial,
do not make leadership. Usually it is the obvious human
qualities in a man that make other men respect him.~
One common pitfall that I have observed in the
Navy in the art of leadership is the paternalistic philo-
sophy of deciding what is and what is not good for men
without regard to the thoughts of the men concerned to
accomplish some end. Unfortunately this attitude can and
does change very easily into a condition of ego inflation,
which the leader derives from his altruistic virtue, and
bears little relation to what his follov^ers really want.
In such situations the leader is essentially more concerned
to enhance his own self-righteousness than to be useful
to others. 2 In the military with no profit motive, the
reputation of an officer with his seniors can be greatly
influenced by the actions of the men serving under him.
Consequently the officer is supersensitive about the
activities of the men that might reflect on him. This
leads to a variety of misunderstandings and restrictions.
•"william B. Given, Bottom-up Management (New York:
Harper Brothers, 1943), p. 93-
20rdway Tead, The Art of Leadership (New York;
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935)? p. 223.
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In the Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet in 1943, the com-
manding officer of a ship was required to explain in writ-
ing to the admiral, whenever more than two of his crew
were arrested by the shore patrol in any one month. This
resulted in many restrictions on the crews to prevent the
commanding officers from unfavorable scrutiny in the eyes
of his superiors. This type of action violates an im-
portant working principle for human relations, that the
officer making the decision must try to see the impact
down the line.
There is a strong feeling in the Navy today that
everything would be wonderful if we could turn back the
clock to the "good old days" before the war when there
was no reenlistment problem and a waiting list of men try-
ing to get in the service. There was a very low turnover
but this did not necessarily mean high job enthusiasm.
Obviously, if there is widespread unemployment and a
buyers market for labor, the low turnover may have nothing
to do with the way the men felt about the Navy.-'- The facts
of the situation may be that the men were happy to stay in
the Navy because working conditions and industrial rela-
tions were even more primitive in industry. Not so today,
nJarl Heyel, How to Create Job Enthusiasm (New
Y ork: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1942), p. 29.
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under the heading of "What You Can Expect of DuPont" the
E. I. DuPont De Nemours and Company writes this to their
employees;
There are several reasons why people work. The pri-
mary reason of course is to obtain food, clothing, and
shelter for themselves and their families. But as
Americans with the highest standard of living, we are
not satisfied with just basic necessities. We want of
course a fair rate of pay, but that alone is not enough.
V'e want a good work place, with proper lighting, ven-
tilation, and safe working conditions. We want to
work for a good supervisor, who is well trained for his
job and who appreciates the individual worker. W« want
congenial working relations with our associates, and
we want to be treated as important and necessary mem-
bers of the work team. We want to feel that merit and
ability will bring advancement as opportunities arise,
and to feel a sense of security in our work. . .Dupont
is trying to provide these essentials of satisfactory
employment. . .Employee relations policies have been
developed with these requirements in mind. 1
The top command of the Navy could very profitably
publish to everyone an aim that could be related to every-
day work that is not so lofty as the responsibilities set
forth in the Key West agreement. Something that each man
could understand and believe and would clarify the per-
sonnel management aims of the Navy. For example, the pub-
lished aim of the American Brake Shoe Corporation is:
to make our company a better place to work, a better
neighbor in the community, a better company to sell to,




E. I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., Working With
DuPont-A Handbook for Employees (Wilmington, Del., 19!?4)
,
22.
^William B. Given, Jr., Bottom-up Management (New
York: Harper Brothers, 194-8), p. 41.
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There is no warmth in Navy management, it is an imperson-
al, cold bureaucracy.
Another example of confusing policy, is failure to
recognize a man's family as being an important part of the
Navy morale. In some cases, mountains are virtually moved
to help some unfortunate dependent and in other cases, the
policy is to ignore the wife. The private aspirations and
responsibilities of each and every man should be recog-
nized. 1 The theory is that if the ¥/ife is loyal to the
Navy and is proud of her husband and his Job, it is easier
for the man to put himself whole-heartedly into his work.
The home and the job overlap, a man lives his home in his
job and his job in his home. It is proving a very diffi-
cult chore to reenlist the man whose wife is not willing
to invest her life in the Navy.
A word of caution at this time seems appropriate.
The theories of democratic leadership are sound and with
continuing social change will become even more necessary
for satisfied efficient men. However, with more than one-
hundred and fifty years of autocratic leadership and social
caste as traditions in the Navy, revolutionary change is
impractical and impossible. There must, however, be an un-
derstanding of this philosophy of leadership and an
William B. Given, Jr., Reaching Out in Management
(New York i Harper Brothers, 1949) 9 p. 40.
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acceptance depending on the abilities of the managers. It
should be manifested first in the everyday working rela-
tions on board ship in the various routines. For example,
an excellent place to start would be for the Commander-in-
Chief to remove from his regulation book the rigid require-
ments for maintaining a watch. Let the Commanding Officer
of the ship, who ultimately is responsible, through demo-
cratic leadership workout a suitable watch-standing sched-
ule, I would venture a guess that the result would be con-
siderably different from that prescribed by the Commander-
in-Chief, and be more economical in the use of manpower,
yet as efficient. The maintaining of the social difference
between officers and enlisted men is a difficult idea to
blend with the idea of democratic leadership. Theoretic-
ally there should be no status, the Navy personnel should
be all egalitarians, but people do not react that way. It
is the ambiguity of status and not overemphasis that is
most provoking, one has only to think of the subtle prob-
ing of two strangers to find out where each fits in.* In
order to attract and hold the caliber of man necessary to
maintain first-rate Naval Officers, the higher social
status must be made possible either through higher pay or
through officers 1 clubs and other privileges. The purpose of
1,1Communication Problems of the Front Office",
Fortune . ^ay 1951*
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this study is to find ways whereby the Navy can compete
with industry for manpower on a little bit better than





In the dealing with the new management problems
brought about by recent social change, the naval leaders
must become aware of their increased responsibility for
understanding, developing, and coordinating as opposed to
directing groups of men engaged in many activities. To
accomplish this, communications play a vital part in the
operations of an efficient organization. Communications
is closely related to human relations since most personal
relationships are carried on through some form of communi-
cations, verbal or written. The Navy is very efficient in
downward communications, the ships and stations are all
but suffocated with orders, policies, and plans necessary
for the operation and maintenance of the world's largest
Navy. This downward flow is extremely Important even though
some people complain of the vast number of papers they
must peruse. Lack of information or misinformation results
in misunderstandings. The large and adequate flow of in-
formation fosters a pride in the Navy man's work and enjoy-
ment. It improves his morale and stature as an indivi-
dual by instilling a feeling of belonging. Downward com-
munications are an intergral part of the organization and
are readily accepted and made use of more or less effec-
tively by the Navy.
Communications generally in the Navy are recog-




managers they are responsible for formulation of plans
at their level and for issuing directives that put the
plan into effect. They believe that it is the responsi-
bility of others to carry out these directives and fail to
see the value of encouraging juniors to participate. They
do not provide clear, unobstructed, channels for funnel-
ing information, opinions, and attitudes up through the
organization. Good communications are a r.roeess that
flow upward, downward and laterally through the organi-
zation.
Communication in industry as well as the Navy is
an important problem. How often have you heard questions
such as: Why is the lower-level interpretation of ob-
jectives, policies, and procedures frequently so differ-
ent from top-level intentions? Why does it take so long to
have policies understood and executed at the working level?
Can't people read or hear the orders they have been given?
What can be done to speed up the whole process af com-
munications?!
Since downward communications are thoroughly devel-
oped in the Navy, there remains then another important
direction of communications to examine, up?/ard.
1
Edmund P. Learned, David N. Ulrich, and Donald R.
Booz, Executive Action (Andover, .Massachusetts $ The
Andover Press, Ltd., 195D» P»6.
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What then can be said of its value? To the manager, it is
through unobstructed upward conimunications that he is able
to determine how effective are his directives. Many orders
are sown on dry and barren soil because the issuance was
poorly timed and the manager was unaware that the recipients
were not ready to receive the order nor would they accept
the order.
For a commander to gain full acceptance and under-
standing of decisions, his subordinates should be permit-
ted to discuss the pros and cons of the decisions if prac-
tical. Appreciation and loyalty, by the very nature of
man, results from self-expression. Superiors should en-
courage the asking of questions and solicit ideas. They
should listen sincerely and sympathetically with the in-
tention of using workable ideas.
Upward communications are necessary if the officers
are to learn whether the men are getting the meaning inten-
ded by downward communications. Some downward communications
are ambiguous, but the fault is rarely discovered without
good upward communications. Juniors see directives in the
light of their own biases and experience. Without upward
communications, the seniors are never sure of the interpre-
tations and reactions of the juniors.
If any ideas of value are to be solicited and
offered, there must be free upward communications to
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motivate the juniors to take the trouble to submit the
ideas.
To the subordinate, upward communications help to
satisfy the basic human need of personal worth. Personal
worth is always injured when people do not have a chance
to express their ideas. The subordinate's dignity is re-
spected only when he is invited to express his reactions
to what he is told.
Upward communications provide a release of emotion-
al tension and pressure which would otherwise dissipate
itself through criticism of the authority and the result-
ing discontent and loss of efficiency.
The Navy by its very nature is authoritarian. It
follows, that it is imperative in matters where subordin-
ates participate, that we be more democratic. Nothing is
more fundamental to democracy than upward communications in
which the ideas of subordinates ar^ given prompt and sym-
pathetic hearing, followed by such action as is desirable.
The mere stating that upward communications are
essential for good management, and the actual adopting, is
an entirely different thing. There are multitudinous
barriers that act as blocks to the upward flow that must
be recognized as being inherent in the temperament and
habits of supervisors. Gome of the barriers to upward com-
munications are discussed below.
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The universal feeling in the Navy that the admirals
in V7ashington do not know what is going on in the fleet is
a failure of upward communications. The physical distance
between Washington and the ships and stations is great and
the admirals rarely come face to face with the people in-
volved. Communications are virtually impossible because of
the inaccessibility.
The complexity of the channels and the dilution of
the information distorts an upward communication to such
an extent that there is usually small resemblance to the
original thought, particularly if the nature of the com-
munication is a complaint or reflection on anyone in the
organization. As the communication passes up the hierarcy
of the organization, the contact between the various levels
of supervision becomes fewer and more hurried and less at-
tention is given to it.
The most formidable barriers to communications are
the blocks introduced into channels by the superior him-
self. If the boss seems too busy, or preoccupied with
other work, or impatient, or annoyed, or distressed, this
attitude will place an insurmountable communication barrier
between them in the future.
Sometimes the boss is lulled into a false sense of
security by thinking that "no news is good news' 1 where
actually upward communications have been squeezed down to
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ineffectiveness. He may delude himself into thinking he
knows what his juniors are thinking or maybe he is the
type of person who thinks he is being disloyal to the or-
ganization to listen to juniors 1 complaints, particularly
if they are intemperately made. This attitude makes up-
ward communications most difficult.
If the boss is the type who is unable to stand
criticism and is naturally defensive about his actions,
the good employees will spare him the displeasure of in-
formation that is not complimentary or good news. For the
manager this is the type of information he needs the most
because it may forestall a major crisis in the future.
Some supervisors resist becoming involved in per-
sonal problems of juniors. This effectively closes part
of his communication channel up, because job problems and
personal problems are often closely linked and it is diffi-
cult to discuss one without the other.
The amount of time a man spends on communications
reflects the man's philosophy of management. A manager
who has freed himself of much of his routine responsi-
bilities and is engaged in building individual subordinates
and developing teamwark in his group will rank communica-
tions high in priority and will allow time for it, since it
is the nerve center of such a leader's management. In con-
trast, the boss who acts alone, usually gets his problems

3*
complex and explosive, and fails to act on undesirable con-
ditions previously brought to his attention, receives no
communica tions from below, and is usually so busy "putting
out fires" he doesn't have time to communicate*
In the Navy there is no mechanism for the appeal of
the decision of a superior oth-sr than a legal decision.
The subordinate does not have the freedom to communicate
which the senior has. Very few men will grossly intrude on
the superior's time.
There is no real incentive by the subordinate to
communicate up. There are rewards, promotions and praise
for those who carry out downward communications as well as
penalties for those who fail to act.
Communication from subordinate to superior cannot
be as well-prepared as the downward flow which is carefully
thought out by a staff, strengthened by research, careful
writing, editing, and visual aids. And because of tradi-
tion and authority behind communications down, they flow
more easily that way than up. The semantic barrier for the
junior is greater, he is attempting to communicate an idea
to a person whose work and responsibilities are different.
The junior must gain acceptance from one of greater status
and authority, and he may be handicapped by being less
fluent than the downward communicator.
Unless seniors are particularly receptive, juniors
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have a tendency to hold back bad news, unfavorable reports,
and reports of mistakes and failures. Information will be
withheld under these circumstances by fear, dislike, in-
difference, or because superiors are defensive about listen-
ing to bad news, and amissions and errors are minimized by
friendly motives.
Assuming then, that for good adminl strati on and
satisfied sailors and officers, communications must be a
two-way street, and that there are many obstacles that get
in the way of upward communications, the reader may ask
what sort of information should be communicated up? Gener-
ally the good Navy manager wants to know matters that fall
into four general categories;
1. How juniors feel about the Navy, their work
and about their associates.
2. What the juniors are doinf, their achievements
and their progress*
3. What ideas juniors may have for improvements
within the Navy.
4. Information ~n areas of difficulty or future
difficulty.
The area that is most barren in the Navy is the
juniors* thoughts and feelings about the Navy, their jobs,
and their shipmates and associates in the Navy. The reason
this is true is because this is the area in which most
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Navy managers think they know the most, since everyone
lives on board the same ship, all eat the same, snd all
have the same experiences. In reality though this is the
area in which they know the least, because real feelings
do not spoi:taneousl; flow up because of the barriers men-
tioned above snd because little ^eal effort is exerted to
find the answers. Some of the questions to be understood
are spelled out below;
1. Are enlisted men and junior officers satisfied
with their pay in relation to similar jobs in industry? How
do you know? What have you done to find out?
2. Is the watchstanding felt to be reasonable?
From whom did you get the information?
3. Do the officers and sailors feel the v/orkload
is fairly distributed? What positive evidence have you of
this?
4. What the men think about the habitability of
the ship? Do they tell you this?
5. Is there confusion as to who is to do what?
Is authority clearly st^t^d and understood, particularly
between junior officers, chief petty officers, senior
petty officers and division officers? On what do you base
your opinions? Is it more than wishful thinking?
6. Do subordinates believe that seniors observe
the rules and regulations that they expect subordinates to
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follow? How do you know?
7. What do the sailors and juniors think of the willing-
ness to discuss policies, plans, and actions that affect
their personal liberties.
8. Do juniors think that seniors are interested in
helping with personal or family troubles? How did you de-
termine the feelings in this matter?
9. What do the sailors or junior officers think of the
efficiency of the commanding officer, the squadron or divi-
sion commander, the type commander, and the fleet commander?
What plan do you have for discovering this?
10. Do the juniors think the seniors play favorites?
11. Do juniors think they are ably lead? What method
do you use to find out?
12. Do juniors feel that seniors resist new ideas of
their subordinates without evaluating their worth? Are in-
dividuals afraid to present honest complaints to their
bosses?
13. Do juniors feel that you understand their needs
and desires 2
14. Do seniors know how juniors get along with their
fellow employees?
15. What do juniors think about seniors living up to
promises and expressed policies?
16. What is the Navy's reputation in the community?
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Who tells you this? How sure are you of the facts?
17. What do enlisted men's wives think of the Navy?
Have you ever reviewed how you determine this?
18. Does everyone know far enough in advance about
serious changes so that they can adjust to them?
19 • Do the men think that adequate recreational and edu-
cational facilities are available? Did you ever make a
survey?
Communications upward cannot be left to chance;
spontaneous communications may be unbalanced, a few glaring
weaknesses or successes may get all the emphasis. The
seniors who rely on spontaneous information alone never have
a true picture of conditions, nor do they receive informa-
tion timely enough to forestall trouble. This, I believe,
is one of the reasons for the reenlistment dilemma in the
Navy today. A true picture of the actual feeling of the
men toward reenlistment did not filter through to the top
level command until too late. The present furious action
is taking place as a result of history, of actual reen-
listment figures, when remedial action should have started
at least four years ago.
By far the most effective method of getting the
ideas of juniors is sympathetic, intelligent, listening.
This apparently lost art has many pitfalls and is complica-
ted. The thoughtful leader must beware of over-simplification
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of the analysis of what he hears. Different people on
different levels of supervision have entirely different in-
terpretations of the same idea. Action should be taken on
interpretation given by the lower level not the manager's
or what the manager wishes the juniors would think. When
listening to complaints or bouquets, the senior should
strive to learn the cause of the information; it is human
nature to cover up the real causes of complaints. Experi-
enced seniors know that juniors tell the boss only what they
think he wants to hear.
Actions of seniors speak as loud a3 words. Upward
communications may be stopped or encouraged effectively
by the actions of the superior such as grimaces, silences,
smiles, scowls, a setting of the jaw, a reddening of the
face or a stiffening of the body. The senior's attitude
must never be condescending if upward communications are
to be Jiorth the trouble of listening. Our native concept
of the dignity of man and our concept of the worthiness of
juniors as individuals demand that ideas be accepted on an
equal basis.
Good communications up the line of administration
then results in the long range achievement of good leader-
ship, the development and satisfaction of the individual
through strengthening of the human need for self-expression
and participation, and the crying need for the promotion of
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loyalty and respect for the Navy. The immediate rewards to
the top command and all commands through the scalar chain
of authority are:
1. An improved picture of the accomplishments and feel-
ings of subordinates at all levels.
2. Trouble spots are isolated before a crisis ensues.
3. Effective reporting systems by juniors are estab-
lished.
4. Better answers to problems are forthcoming from
management and responsibility is eased.
5. Management helps easy flow and acceptance of com-
munications down.
Earl Planty and William Machaver, "Upward Com-
munications: A Project in Executive Development", The
Development of Executive Talent , ed. M. Joseph Dooher and
Vivienne Marquis (New York: American Management Associa-




In this paper I have emphasized my contention that
the Navy can be made an all-volunteer organization again
and it is within the grasp of the Navy command, if the
reasons for sailors not reenlisting are explored objec-
tively. Certain disadvantages such as, long absences from
home, rigorous operating schedules, loss of fringe benefits,
and the low pay are detrimental to reenlistment, but the
most important incentive for men to get out of the military
service is the poor personnel management. Unless the per-
sonnel management improves, the chances for a volunteer
Navy are very slim.
Changes in physical appearances, in styles, and in
designs are apparent, but there are changes in our behavior
and temperament that are not so obvious, values and in-
terests also change. Good morale like a good friendship
or marriage is not something that can be achieved and then
forgotten. Vast changes in values, behavior, and ideas
of labor management relations have occurred among the
working class.
The big majority of the Navy military managers are
unaware that these changes have occurred during and since
World War II, because they have been isolated from
Abraham T. Collier, "Dilemma in Human Relations",




labor management relations and because of the inherent re-
sistance to change; they hate to see the "good old days"
fade away. In conversations with naval officers regard-
ing the reenlistment situation, most will blame the diffi-
culty on some reason over which they, personally, have no
control. This is a natural reaction since the human animal
has no desire to be linked with a project that is a fail-
ure.
A big step in bringing the bosses in line with the
sailors would be to substitute democratic leadership gradu-
ally for the traditional autocratic type of leadership.
This can be accomplished in the same way as public relations
was sold to the Navy, by seminars, by emphasizing the
democratic ideas of leadership in service schools, and most
important, by educating the admirals in command so that
they can set an example.
Another step is to introduce to the Navy the philo-
sophy of communications upward as being as important as
downward. In my experience in the Navy, I know of very
few naval officers who know what communications up are. I
must admit that I did not put much thought or time on this
phase of management on previous tours of sea duty. The
usual attitude toward the brave officer or man is that he
is a radical if he attempts to communicate up the chain of
command. Very few ideas or complaints are sent up the
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chain except when specifically directed by the higher au-
thority. Several years ago when Mr. Eisenhower was elected
president there were some loud "rumblings" coming out of
Washington about balancing the budget. I was very enthusi-
astic and decided to take advantage of the article in the
Navy regulations that permits a member of the Navy to
write to the Secretary of the Navy to suggest measures to
economize.
My suggestion was to combine the staffs that issued
civilian personnel instructions to the three military ser-
vices. My suggestion came back disapproved on the grounds
that the regulations for civilian personnel in the Navy
were not applicable to civilian personnel in the Array or
the Air Force in spite of the fact that they were all based
on the same manual from the Civil Service Commission. The
communications-upward met a cold reception and by the time
it reached the Secretary of the Navy there were many many
reasons why it could not be done and no encouragement. I
still think it would result in a savings.
The third step is to establish some management ob-
jectives or aims that can be published and that can be re-
lated to the everyday tasks of the officers and men. Every-
one should know what the Navy is trying to accomplish. In
every war it has been necessary for the President of the
United States to establish the aims of the war, but for
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some reason or other when peace comes the aims are accom-
plished and the military service finds itself in a vacuum
with no knowledge of what it is really trying to do ex-
cept as set forth in the mission. The feeling engendered
by this can be summed up in the phrase expressed many times,
"The men in the fleet think the admirals in Washington
don't give a damn about them."
In the final analysis we can't expect to make the
Navy a "Utopia", but we can make it better than industry.
Our goal should be to make the Navy, by intelligent, alert
personnel management, a place where young men will be
proud to work and where they will gain satisfaction from
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